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Abstract
Do people adapt to changes in income? This paper shows that there is no evidence of adaptation
to income in GSOEP (1984-2015) and UKHLS (1996-2015) data. Following the empirical approach of
Vendrik (2013), I arrive at this surprising answer by estimating (dynamic) life satisfaction equations,
in which I simultaneously enter contemporaneous and lagged terms for a respondent’s own house-
hold income and their estimated reference income. Additionally, I instrument for own income and
include lags of a large set of controls. Furthermore, I find that people also do not adapt to changes
in reference income. Instead, reference income effects may be subject to reinforcement over time. To
explain my findings, a comprehensive account of the puzzling and often divergent results of Ferrer-i
Carbonell and Van Praag (2008), Binder and Coad (2010), Di Tella et al. (2010), and Pfaff (2013) is
given. What was found to be adaptation to raw household income in these studies turns out to have
been driven by reinforcement of an initially small negative effect of household size that grows large
over time. Implications of this result for the estimation of equivalence scales with subjective data are
discussed.
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1 Introduction
When people earn more, they tend to become more satisfied with their lives. However, with time,
people may grow accustomed to higher incomes. As a consequence, people’s life satisfaction tends to
decline. This phenomenon is commonly called adaptation. In the present study, I show that no significant
adaptation to income can be observed in two of the data-sets (GSOEP and UKHLS1 ) that are most
commonly used in the study of happiness.
With this paper I follow a large literature that evaluates whether people adapt to various life events
more generally (for studies on adaptation in non-pecuniary domains, see e.g. Angeles, 2010; Clark et al.,
2008; Hanglberger and Merz, 2011). There are some previous studies that investigate whether we adapt
to income in life satisfaction (e.g. Di Tella et al., 2010; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2010; Vendrik, 2013;
Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag, 2008; Wolbring et al., 2013). However, those studies do not form
a consensus. Despite this lack of consensus, a number of authors, particularly those working in the
capabilities approach, simply assume that adaptation to income in life satisfaction has been empirically
established (Sen, 1985; Nussbaum, 2000; Qizilbash, 2006; Schokkaert, 2007; Jayawickreme and Pawelski,
2012; Graham and Nikolova, 2015) - a presumed fact which can then be used to undermine the normative
significance that may be put upon measures of life satisfaction. Furthermore, adaptation has previously
been put forward as a possible explanation for the well-known and much debated Easterlin Paradox
(Clark et al., 2008; Clark, 2015; Easterlin, 2016). Thus, there is some importance to assessing whether
adaptation to income in life satisfaction does in fact occur.
Before doing so, it is useful to clarify my terminology. By adaptation to income I mean that the
absolute size of the long-run2 effect of income on life satisfaction is smaller than the absolute size of
the contemporaneous effect of income on life satisfaction. One may further distinguish between partial
and full adaptation. Partial adaptation refers to a situation in which the absolute size of the long-run
effect is indeed smaller, but where the long-run effect is nevertheless significant and of the same sign.
In contrast, full adaptation occurs in situations where the contemporaneous effect is significant, but
the long-run effect is zero, or insignificant. Following Vendrik (2013), I call the opposite of adaptation
“reinforcement”. Reinforcement occurs when long- and short-run effects have the same sign and when
the absolute size of the long-run effect of income on life satisfaction is larger than the absolute size of
the short-run effect3. An illustration of reinforcement, as well as full and partial adaptation is given in
figure 1.
In almost all studies (except Vendrik, 2013), adaptation to income is exclusively taken to be adaptation
to own income. However, this need not be so. Given that we know that the incomes of peers (henceforth,
“reference incomes”) tend to have negative contemporaneous effects on life satisfaction (e.g. McBride,
2001; Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2005; Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007), it may well be that such reference incomes
could also be subject to either adaptation or reinforcement. If so, it then becomes useful to evaluate
what the dynamic effect of joint income, i.e. the combined effect of own and reference income is. Doing
so is particularly important, since only observing a nil or negative long-run effect of joint income would
be compatible with the postulate of the Easterlin Paradox that the long-run time-series correlation of
1Which is a combination of the older British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and its successor Understanding Society.
2I take the long-run to be a situation in which income and life satisfaction are unchanging and in equilibrium with
respect to each other.
3There may be cases where the sign of the short-run effect is different from the long-run effect and where both effects
are significant. I do not give a separate name to such cases.
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Figure 1: Adaptation types. In all cases a positive and persistent income shock occurs at time zero. I
assume that higher incomes have a positive effect on life satisfaction and that the adaptation process
ends after K periods.
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GDP per capita and life satisfaction fails to be significantly positive.
The present paper builds on the empirical approach of Vendrik (2013), which appears to be the
most robust study on adaptation to income to date. I give a much needed attempt at corroboration
of that paper’s main ideas with updated GSOEP data (with ten additional waves). This attempt at
corroboration seems well justified, since it appears that the results of Vendrik (2013) suffer from a crucial
omitted variable bias, namely his omission of partner employment status. With the addition of this
variable, all evidence of adaptation that Vendrik (2013) obtains is eradicated.
Beyond that, as the first in the literature on adaptation to income, I explicitly compare estimates
obtained from the two main surveys used in the literature on subjective well-being, i.e. the GSOEP
and UKHLS. Given that it often seems in the literature as though results obtained from surveys that
are representative of the population of one particular country are generalizable to all industrialized
countries, it is especially important to investigate whether this implicit assumption does in fact hold.
This is especially true today, when it has become apparent that many results in psychology and economics
are not replicable (Earp and Trafimow, 2015; Chang and Li, 2018), while there is still a lack of attempts
at replication (Hamermesh, 2007). Moreover, I give a comprehensive account of why one may observe
significant adaptation with raw household income, while one finds much less or no adaptation when using
equivalized household income.
My key substantive findings are summarized as follows: Firstly, no adaptation to income can be
observed in any of the preferred specifications. This holds true independently of the country considered,
whether reference or own income is analyzed, and whether an instrument for own income was used or
not. Secondly, all previous evidence of adaptation was driven by omitted omitted variable bias; most
crucially via the omission of lags of controls for household composition and partner employment status.
Thirdly, reference income effects are large, negative, and not subjected to adaptation. As a consequence,
my long-run estimates of joint-income, i.e. the combined effects of own and reference income are always
insignificant and close to zero. These results imply that as everybody grows richer, nobody grows happier.
This unfortunate finding is in line with the Easterlin paradox.
The next section provides a review of the literature. Section 3 outlines my empirical approach. Section
4 presents my data. In section 5, I present my results. In section 6 I make some concluding remarks.
Additional robustness checks are available in the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
The earliest studies on adaptation to income were arguably those of the “Leiden School” by Van Praag
and his collaborators (e.g. Van Praag, 1971). In the main, this series of studies found that responses to
an “income evaluation”4 question were an increasing function of the respondent’s income. In other words,
richer individuals would evaluate higher incomes as worse, thus giving indication of what was then termed
a “preference drift” and which was interpreted as adaptation to income5. In the somewhat more modern
literature, Clark (1999) is among the first to exploit panel data to assess adaptation to income. Using
the first two waves of the BHPS, he estimates an ordered probit regression on job satisfaction in which
4Which asks: While keeping prices constant, what after-tax total monthly income would you consider for your family
to be: “very bad”, “bad” “sufficient”, “insufficient”, “good”, “very good”.
5However an explanation in terms of reference incomes explains this result equally well and was pursued in e.g. Kapteyn
et al. (1978)
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Figure 2: Illustration of how different adaptation/reinforcement patterns in own and reference income
may yield a distinct dynamic pattern in joint income. I assume partial adaptation in own income and
reinforcement in reference income. A positive short-run and a negative long-run joint income effect is
the result.
5
both current and one-year lagged gross monthly income are entered. Both variables enter the regression
significantly. Moreover, while the contemporaneous effect is positive, the lagged term is negative and of
roughly equal absolute size. This implies full adaptation. Another study is that of Burchardt (2005) who
uses all of the first ten waves of the BHPS, and regresses income satisfaction on current net household
income and current change in net HH income. In the main she finds not evidence of adaptation, but of
reinforcement instead.
The aforementioned studies are not considering adaptation in life satisfaction, but rather adaptation
in particular domain satisfactions (income, job). In contrast, Stutzer (2004) appears to be one of the
first studies to pose the question of adaptation to income in life satisfaction in particular. Using Swiss
Household Panel (SHP) data he regresses life satisfaction on the ln of household income, as well as
responses to either a question on sufficient or minimum acceptable income. These latter responses,
interpreted as measures of income aspirations, have a significant negative effect that is only slightly
smaller in absolute size than the coefficient for income. In a further step, he shows that income aspirations
are an increasing function of own income. In combination, these two sets of results may be viewed as
evidence of adaptation6.
The most well known and widely cited7 study on adaptation to income in life satisfaction is that
of Di Tella et al. (2010). Because of that, I will take their approach as my baseline for the analysis to
follow in section 5. Using data from GSOEP (1984-2000; restricted to West Germany), they regress life
satisfaction on the contemporaneous level of (the ln of) real post-tax household income, as well as up to
4-year lags of this income measure. To test for adaptation, they perform tests on the significance of the
sum of these lags as a well as the sum of lags and the contemporaneous coefficient. In their main analysis,
they obtain a large positive contemporaneous effect (= 0.23), find clear evidence for adaptation (
∑
lags
= 0.15), and cannot reject the hypothesis of full adaptation (see table 1, columns 2 and 5)8. When
distinguishing between party-political lines, both groups benefit from higher incomes, but only leftists
adapt. They further find no evidence of adaptation for the self-employed, but full adaptation for the
employed. When distinguishing between men and women, this result only holds for females, finding no
evidence of adaptation for men. In a follow-up, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2010) replicate these findings
with up to 7 rather than 4 year lags and by further dividing the sample into homeowners and those that
are renting. They only find evidence of adaptation for home owners, thus providing evidence that the
degree to which individuals adapt to income levels may be moderated by their level of wealth.
Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag (2008) follow a somewhat different strategy. Also using GSOEP
data (2000-2004), they use first differences to account for individual fixed effects. They also use post-tax
household income as their measure of income and include up to 4-year lags. They run four specifications,
one without any controls, one with levels of a standard set of contemporaneous demographic controls, one
using the first differences of all controls, and finally one with their lagged first differences. When using
6Easterlin (2005) follows a similar strategy of trying to infer adaptation via observing aspirations. Easterlin uses nation-
ally representative American data from 1978 and 1994 that asked respondents what sets of goods (and life circumstances)
they deem desirable for a good life, and which of these goods they already possess. He shows that for each of the cohorts he
constructs, both the number of desired and owned goods increase across the period by roughly the same amount. In so far
as what people deem part of the “good life” (p.520), in fact contributes to life satisfaction, these results may - as Easterlin
states - indicate complete adaptation. However, an alternative interpretation in terms of relative consumption against an
external contemporaneous benchmark would also explain these results.
7Google Scholar citation count: 483 (31.10.2018)
8This is in contrast to their simultaneous results on social status for which they also find adaption, but can reject the
hypothesis of full adaption (see their table 1, columns 4 and 5).
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no controls they find adaptation of about 60%. However, when using contemporaneous terms of their
controls, they obtain evidence of full adaptation. In contrast, when using all lags of the first-differences,
observed adaptation is reduced to as little as 40%. Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag do not offer an
explanation for these strange results.
Pfaff (2013) makes use of both GSOEP (1992-2010, separating East- and West- Germany) and BHPS
(1996-2008) data. His estimation strategy is in the main identical to that of Di Tella et al. (2010). He
obtains effect sizes that are up to 5 times larger for Germany than for the UK, but does not comment
on this puzzling result. Moreover, he experiments with different measures of income, namely raw real
labor income, real net household income and equivalized real net household income. It turns out that he
only finds evidence of (complete) adaptation when either using labor income or raw real net household
income; but not when using equivalized household income. Like Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag in
the case of their peculiar results, Pfaff does not give an explanation for this strange result, but simply
notes that equivalized incomes are to be preferred for what he views as theoretical reasons (see p.7).
Binder and Coad (2010), who use a somewhat different estimation strategy, face the same puzzlement
as Pfaff (2013) : when using raw household income they obtain evidence of adaptation, but when using
equivalized household income they fail to do so.
In addition to the above, a small number of studies have found much weaker adaptation (Di Tella
and MacCulloch, 2010) or no adaptation at all (Crettaz and Suter, 2013; Clark et al., 2016) when
looking at those at the bottom of the income distribution in particular. Clark et al. (2016) use GSOEP
data (1985-2012) and regresses life satisfaction on a series of dummies indicating the length of poverty
spells (whilst controlling for individual fixed effects and a set of standard demographic controls). An
individual is deemed to be in poverty in any given year if her annual equivalized household income falls
below 60% of the country’s median equivalent household income. They find that the effect of being
in poverty does not decline with time, thus implying the absence of adaptation in life satisfaction to
poverty. Crettaz and Suter (2013) using Swiss data, perform a similar analysis in that they regress life
satisfaction on a continuous variable, indicating the number of years spent in poverty, while controlling
for contemporaneous household income and demographic controls. Unlike Clark et al. (2016) they only
exploit cross-sectional variation in life satisfaction, and do not use individual fixed effects. They find no
effect of the length of the poverty spell on life satisfaction beyond that of current household income, thus
also indicating complete absence of adaptation9.
Finally, Frijters et al. (2008), using Australian panel data, finds partial adaptation in individuals who
experienced a major improvement or worsening of their financial situation in the preceding 12 months.
In contrast, Paul and Guilbert (2013), who make use of the same data, find no evidence of adaptation
when using household income with up to four year lags. However, given that they - contrary to almost all
other literature - also find no evidence of a significant contemporaneous effect, they interpret this finding
to be most likely be driven by attenuation bias from measurement error in the income variable.
There is a large literature on reference incomes. However, almost all of them simply focus on the
contemporaneous effects of reference incomes. Although there is a small literature that measures reference
incomes directly via the subjective assessments of respondents (e.g. Senik, 2009; Mayraz et al., 2009;
Goerke and Pannenberg, 2015; Dumludag et al., 2016; Clark et al., 2017 ), most studies compute reference
9In this setup, a positive coefficient would have been indicative of adaptation. Their definition of poverty is the same as
that of Clark et al. (2016)
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incomes on the basis of cell means in income of a presumed reference group. Such groups may either
be defined in spatial terms (e.g. Luttmer, 2005; Kingdon and Knight, 2007; Ifcher et al., 2016), or
in terms of similar demographic characteristics, particularly age and education (e.g. McBride, 2001;
Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2005; Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007; Vendrik, 2013). However, and with the exception
of particularly narrow spatially defined reference groups (Ifcher et al., 2016), this choice seems not to
matter, yielding negative effects for contemporaneous reference incomes that tend to roughly equal the
contemporaneous effects of own income10. There are only very few studies on adaptation/reinforcement
to reference incomes in life satisfaction. Exceptions are the studies of D’Ambrosio and Frick (2012),
and Vendrik (2013). Unfortunately, D’Ambrosio and Frick (2012) only use a lag of one year for own
income. Moreover, their specification for the (dynamic) effects of reference incomes is estimated with
separate terms for the income gap of the respondent with respect to those that are richer or poorer
than the respondent (the static part), and the income gap to those that became richer or poorer than
the respondent (the dynamic part). This kind of formulation makes it very difficult to understand the
dynamics and relative strengths of the (joint) long-run, short-run and adaptation effects of own and
reference income.
Vendrik (2013) may be the most robust investigation on both adaptation to own as well as reference
income. He also uses GSOEP data (1984-2007; restricted to West Germany). In the main, he combines
the approaches of Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag (2008) and Di Tella et al. (2010) and regresses
life satisfaction on the current ln of equivalized real net household income and reference income as well
as lags of both variables11. He also includes lags of all his control variables. Moreover, he includes
a term for one-year lagged life satisfaction, yielding an error correction model that implicitly models
effects of unincluded lags of income in the further past (also see section 3.2). In the main analyses he
instruments income using the approach of Luechinger (2009) and Luttmer (2005). When simply using
observed income, Vendrik is unable to obtain any evidence of adaptation to own income. However, in
his (seemingly) more robust regressions where he instruments for own income he does obtain evidence
of adaptation. With respect to reference income he finds an insignificant and negative contemporaneous
effect of reference income that is reinforced over time to yield a significantly negative long-run effect of
reference income that is larger than that of own income. Jointly considered, this hence yields a significant
positive short-run effect of joint income, to which more than full adaptation occurs, such that he finds a
negative but insignificant long-run joint income effect.
A number of points may be taken from this review of the literature. First and with respect to
adaptation to reference and joint income, the only (to my knowledge) viable study is the one of Vendrik
(2013). Second, whether we observe adaptation to own income seems to depend on whether we use
equivalized or raw household income, and whether we instrument for own income. Only in the case of
raw household income or instrumented income, do we observe adaptation (e.g. Pfaff (2013) and Binder
and Coad (2010)). Third, we observe less adaptation to own income when including lagged terms of
10With respect to particularly volatile economies, this negative effect may not hold and may instead be dominated by a
positive “signaling” effect. See Senik (2004, 2008). Given that West Germany and UK are no such volatile countries in the
estimation period, this should not be a major concern for me.
11He also initially includes a lead of income and controls in his regression. Also given that Vendrik (2013) finds no
anticipation effect when instrumenting for own income, I omit this further extension in all estimations of the present paper.
The null finding for anticipation to own income when using the income instrument (see below), suggests reverse causality
for his estimates of the anticipation term when using observed income (as noted on p.138). If this is indeed the case, and
since income can be assumed to be serially correlated, this inclusion of the leads of observed own income is an instance of
“conditioning on a collider” (Elwert and Winship, 2014), which should lead to biased estimates of all other terms.
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controls (Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag, 2008; Vendrik, 2013). Fourth, individuals on very low incomes
(Crettaz and Suter, 2013; Clark et al., 2016) or less wealthy individuals (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2010)
adapt less than richer ones12. This is arguably in line with the literature on basic needs that postulates
a core minimum that individuals have to achieve (e.g. Doyal and Gough, 1991). Fifth, there seem to be
almost no studies doing cross-country comparative work. The working paper of Pfaff (2013) is the only
exception, but he does not comment on the comparative aspect. The present study attempts to address
each of these five points.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 The basic model
I start with a distributed lag model very similar to that of Di Tella et al. (2010), with the main difference
being my inclusion of reference incomes:
LSi,t =
K∑
k=0
β0−k ln(yi,t−k) +
K∑
k=0
γ0−k ln(yrefi,t−k) + φXi,t + µi + τt + i,t (1)
Here LSi,t is the (reported) life satisfaction of individual i at time t, yi,t is a measure of own household
(HH) income, yrefi,t is a measure of reference income, µi is an individual fixed effect, τt is a year fixed
effect and ei,t is assumed to be a normally distributed error term. Xi,t is a vector of time-varying
controls thought to be correlated with both income and life satisfaction. These include: dummies for
numbers of children and adults in the household, employment status of respondent, employment status of
respondent’s partner, dummy for child birth, age, age-squared, marital status, housing tenure, job hours,
dummy for illness, region dummies, and a region-specific linear time trend. These controls are similar
to those chosen by Burchardt (2005), Di Tella et al. (2010) and Vendrik (2013). A precise description
of each of these variables is given in the next section and table A1 of the Appendix. I define reference
incomes by the mean income of the set of individuals up to 5 years older or younger than the respondent
and that have the same educational attainment as the respondent (as measured by a collapsed version
of the CASMIN classification, see table A1).
In this set-up, the contemporaneous, or short-run (SR), effect of own income on life satisfaction is
given by β0. In general the long-run (LR) effect is given by
∑∞
k=0 β0−k, but I assume β0−k = 0∀k > K
in the special case of equation (1). Thus in equation (1), the LR effect is given by
∑K
k=0 β0−k. Finally,∑∞
k=1 β0−k gives the total effect of adaptation13, i.e. the degree to which the effect of income dissipates
with time. We may also generally say that adaptation is given by the difference between the long-run
and the contemporaneous effect (i.e. ADAP = LR − SR). All of this is illustrated in figure 314. Of
12In a related vein, Peng (2017) finds that the effects of reference incomes are moderated by individual’s level of income.
13 Or
∑K
k=1 β0−k in the case of (1))14The study of Wolbring et al. (2013), where they also attempt to study adaptation to income in life satisfaction, pursues
an altogether different approach. They exclusively use lagged first differences (up to three) and no term for the level of
income, i.e LSi,t = γo∆ ln(yt) + γ1∆ ln(yt−1) + γ2∆ ln(yt−2) + φXi,t + µi + i,t. They state that if the effect of the first
differences declines as one moves to higher order lags (i.e. if γ0 > γ1 > γ2), there is evidence of adaptation. This is indeed
what they find. However, such an interpretation is not warranted. All this would imply is that more recent changes in
income have a stronger effect on life satisfaction. In fact, their model presumes that full adaptation will occur. This can be
see by rewriting the model as LSi,t = γo ln(yi,t) + (γ1−γ0) ln(yi,t) + (γ2−γ1) ln(yi,t−2) + (−γ2) ln(yi,t−3) + . . . . Applying
the formula above gives LR = 0 (all terms cancel), SR0 = γo, and ADAP = −γo.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the process modeled in (1) and (2). A positive and persistent income shock in
own income is experienced at time zero. I assume partial adaptation.
course, the same reasoning applies to the estimates of the SR, LR, and adaptation effects of reference
incomes. When looking for the respective joint effects, I may just take the sums of the effects of own and
reference income.
The review in section 2 has made clear that controlling for (at least some) lagged terms of controls can
drastically change results. The reason for this may be as follows: controlling for Xit stems from the belief
that Xit is correlated with yownit and LSit. If this is so, we must also also believe that Xi,t−k is correlated
with yowni,t−k. Given the literature on adaptation to various life events (Angeles, 2010; Clark et al., 2008;
Hanglberger and Merz, 2011), we may have further reason to believe that at least some variables in Xit−k
will also be correlated with LSit15. If this is so, my estimates of the long-run, short-run and adaptation
effects would have to be biased. In particular, any observed adaptation to income may be driven by
unobserved adaptation to changes in any of the covariates in X. Hence I should further extend the
model by adding lags of all control variables that are not perfectly collinear with its contemporaneous
values16. This is similar to the approach of Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag (2008) and Vendrik (2013).
The model thus becomes:
15It may further be that elements in an appropriately constructed vector Xrefit , e.g. levels of unemployment in the
reference group, would behave similarly. I omit this complication from the present investigation.
16This turns out to make a large difference to my results. The aforementioned studies investigating adaptation to
non-monetary life events may therefore also be affected by this problem.
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LSi,t =
K∑
k=0
β0−k ln(yi,t−k) +
K∑
k=0
γ0−k ln(yrefi,t−k) +
K∑
k=0
φ0−kXi,t−k + µi + τt + i,t (2)
When attempting to compare effects obtained from UKHLS and GSOEP, I restrict the observation
window to 1996-2015 for both data-sets to account for the limited coverage of the UKHLS, use the same
income concept (at baseline: real net household income)17, and use comparable controls (see Appendix
table A1). I treat life satisfaction as cardinal rather than ordinal. Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004),
Van Praag and Ferrer-i Carbonell (2008) or Riedl and Geishecker (2014) showed that treating income as
cardinal rather than ordinal makes very little difference to ratios of coefficients and levels of significance.
3.2 Two extensions
Though more robust than the empirical strategy pursued in most other studies (in particular by virtue
of the uncommon use of terms for the lags of controls), there are four further objections to this approach
that I try to alleviate. First, income is measured with error. Such error may be driven by individuals not
being able to accurately report on their income, the need to impute income in some cases, or inaccuracies
in the tax-simulation routines used to arrive at net incomes. Such measurement error may lead to
attenuation bias towards zero of the estimated own income effects. Second, there may unobserved costs
to income generation, such as stress of higher commuting times, which may present a downward bias
to the estimated own income effects. Third, there may be effects of covariates lagged further than K
years, omission of which will yield biased estimates of all included terms. Fourth, life satisfaction may
be an autoregressive process that operates over and above observables. In other words it may be that
life satisfaction at t is partially caused by life satisfaction at t− 1, where the causation is not mediated
by any further variables. I now discuss my remedies for these issues.
3.2.1 Instrumenting
To alleviate the first and second concern, I instrument income following the approach first pursued by
Luttmer (2005) and later adopted by Luechinger (2009) and Vendrik (2013). This approach goes as
follows: For each wave, I predict real individual labor earnings using the respondent’s age, age-squared,
gender and a large set of occupation and industry dummies18. Thus for each wave, I run a regression of
the form ylabouri = α+β1MALE+β2,AGE+β3AGE2+δindINDUSTRYi+φoccOCCUPATIONi+ i.,
where δind and φocc are industry- and occupation-specific parameters. In the German case, I use 4-digit
ISCO88 codes for occupation, and 2-digit NACE codes for industry. In the UK case, I use 3-digit SOC
codes for occupation, and 2-digit SIC codes for industry. In the next step, I sum the predicted earnings
of each individual in the household. I then equivalize this measure for household size and use it to
instrument for observed equivalized household income.
There are two interrelated threats to the exclusion restriction of this instrument. The first concern is
that there may be other time-varying effects on life satisfaction of industry or occupation beyond those
17I choose not to convert Pounds into Euros. Under the assumption that the separate series for inflation used to obtain
a household income measure in constant prices in each country are comparable, my use of lns for all income terms in all
estimations, as well as my use of year fixed effects, renders such a conversion unnecessary.
18For robustness, I also ran regressions with alternative specifications in which I used a separate dummy for each industry
and occupation combination in each wave, and/or where I removed age and/or sex from the regressions. Each of these
alternative gave similar results and are available upon request.
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of time-varying pecuniary returns. On the one hand, it may be that individuals in the same occupation
and industry may form part of the individual’s reference group. Although I control for reference incomes
defined over education and age, there may thus nevertheless be an uncontrolled-for negative effect that
would downwardly bias the IV estimate. On the other hand, it may be that general work conditions in
some industries have gotten better, while pay has increased too. This would lead to an upward bias in
the IV estimate.
The second concern is that respondents may choose to select into particular industries or occupations
in anticipation of changes in income or other benefits that may impact life satisfaction. Pischke and
Schwandt (2012) note that industry choice is indeed correlated with fixed characteristics of individuals.
Given my use of the ln of income and my use of individual fixed-effects, selection into industries or
occupations that is driven by the overall mean of income (or the mean of other benefits) across the
observation window is not a concern. However, when people actively switch industries or occupations in
anticipation of changes in industry- or occupation-specific pecuniary or non-pecuniary returns, and when
the propensity to switch is correlated with unobservables, my estimates may still be biased.
I partially guard against these concerns by later adding contemporaneous and lagged values of all
industry and occupation dummies to the model. The inclusion of these dummies then controls for all
effects of industry and occupation that do not run via individual labor incomes. In that case, bias may
only occur when individuals actively switch industries and occupations in anticipation of hedonic returns
(an upward bias), or via negative reference income effects that are captured by my generated income
variable (a downward bias).
3.2.2 Addition of lagged life satisfaction
To robustify my main estimates against the third and fourth concern, I, add a term for lagged life
satisfaction to the model. This yields an autoregressive distributed lag model of the following form :
LSi,t =
K∑
k=0
β0−k ln(yi,t−k) +
K∑
k=0
γ0−k ln(yrefi,t−k) +
K∑
k=0
φ0−kXi,t−k + ρLSi,t−1 + µi + τt + i,t (3)
Assuming that ρ is positive and smaller than 1, this alleviates the same worries Vendrik (2013) seeks to
solve with his error-correction model, but is a simpler and more intuitive representation19. By repeated
substitution, equation (3) can be rewritten as follows (for brevity I omit terms for reference income,
controls and errors):
LSi,t = β0 ln(yi,t) + (β−1 + ρβo) ln(yi,t−1) + (β−2 + ρβ−1 + ρ2β0) ln(yi,t−2) + . . . (4)
+ (β−4 + ρβ−3 + · · ·+ ρKβo) ln(yi,t−K) +
∞∑
m=1
ρm(
K∑
l=0
ρlβ−K−l) ln(yi,t−K−m) + . . .
Defining β∗0−k, γ∗0−k, and φ∗0−k appropriately this can in turn be rewritten as:
19Indeed, the model of equation 3 could be rewritten to yield an error-correction model.
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LSi,t = β0 ln(yi,t) +
∞∑
k=1
β∗0−k ln(yi,t−k) + γo ln(y
ref
i,t ) +
∞∑
k=0
γ∗0−k ln(y
ref
i,t−k)+ (5)
φ0−kXi,t +
∞∑
k=0
φ∗0−kXi,t−k + µ∗i + τ∗t + ∗i,t
I thus implicitly model the effects of indefinitely long lags of own and reference income, as well as
all controls. There are two equivalent sets of assumptions: Life satisfaction, beyond the part that is
explicitly modeled, is assumed to be an autoregressive process of order 1, with 0 ≤ ρ < 1. Equivalently,
beyond those that are explicitly modeled, I assume the effects of income and all controls at t−K −m to
exponentially decay at rate ρm for m > 0. This homogeneous rate of decay is also assumed for the effects
of the unobserved time-varying controls at t − K − m for m > 0. The latter is a somewhat stringent
assumption.
To obtain the SRk, LR, and adaptation effects, the same formulas as those presented in section 3.1
can be applied to equation (5). The sum β0 +
∑∞
k=1 β
∗
0−k, i.e. the long-run effect of own income, can
be expressed as
∑K
k=0
β0−k
1−ρ (the same goes for reference incomes)20. Unfortunately, in a fixed effects
setting, the OLS estimate of ρ will be downwardly biased for finite T . I therefore apply the bootstrap
bias correction of De Vos et al. (2015) to guard against this concern.
Unfortunately, Vendrik (2013) finds a negative small-T bias in the estimate of ρ, which he claims to
go beyond the Nickell Bias. This is why he fixates ρ to an estimate he obtains from a balanced panel
with T = 21. I face the same problem: When using my full German sample I obtain an estimate of
ρ = 0.13. However, when only selecting respondents who are observed in every wave (which thus yields
an effective T of 29), my estimate of ρ increases to 0.26, which is very close to Vendrik’s estimate of 0.27
(see his discussion on page 146). In turn, when selecting the same subset of respondents, but randomly
selecting an observation window of seven periods (which is closest to mean T when using the full set of
respondents) for each of these respondents, I get an estimate of ρ = 14. This is thus very close to the
estimate obtained from the full set of respondents. I therefore conclude that the smaller estimate of ρ
from the full sample indeed arises from a further, unaccounted-for small-T bias21, and that the larger
estimate for ρ I obtain when T = 28 is less biased and not driven by selection effects that could have
arisen from either the time periods considered or the set of respondents included. Throughout I therefore
fixate ρ to the estimate which I obtain with largest possible T .
3.3 Determining the number of lags
A tricky question is what the appropriate number of lags K is. On the one hand, one would wish to
include as many lags as possible, in order to make the assumptions made for equations (2) and (3) as
plausible as possible. On the other hand, adding more lags is problematic for two reasons: First the
addition of each lag causes the loss of a large number of panel observations. Second, levels of income at t
and t−1 are highly collinear, thus also leading to a loss in efficiency of the estimates. Vendrik determines
the number of lags by first starting with some very large number of lags. He then conducts F- and t-tests
20To see this, set LS and ln(y) to their unchanging long-run values in equation (3) and rearrange.
21This bias also does not appear due to the my use of the particular bias correction of De Vos et al. (2015). When instead
using the Arellano-Bond estimator or the bias correction of Bruno (2005) I get a very similar results.
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Figure 4: Distribution of life satisfaction in Germany (left) and the UK (right).
of the (joint) significance the highest lag of own and reference income. If all tests fail to reject the null
hypothesis of (joint) equality to zero, he removes all highest order lags and repeats the process until he
obtains at least one rejection. At baseline, this leads him to use a maximum lag length of 3, while when
including lagged life satisfaction and instrumenting for income, he finds an appropriate lag length of 1.
When I apply this approach (using either equation (2) or (3) and instrumenting income) I obtain a
lag length of 1 for both the UK and Germany. Given that I have no need to use such a short lag length,
I decided to be more conservative and chose a lag-length of K = 3 for my baseline estimates. This choice
is primarily motivated by the observation of this being the maximum lag length at which I continue to
obtain a sufficiently large Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic (>10) to get reliable IV estimates for almost all
subgroups that I consider. This choice of K = 3 is much closer to the choice of Di Tella et al. (2010),
Pfaff (2013) and Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag (2008) and many others in the literature who use a
lag length of four. However, as it turns out, these considerations turn out not to be very important, since
my IV results on the full samples are largely robust to lag lengths between 1 and 5 for both the UK and
Germany. At higher order lags my instruments become weak in the UK and the reference income effect
is estimated rather imprecisely. See tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix for the relevant regressions.
4 Data
At baseline, I make use of all available GSOEP waves (1-32), spanning the time 1984-2015. For compar-
ative purposes, I also use all available waves of the UKHLS, which combines waves 6-1822 of the BHPS
22I exclude waves 1-5, as life satisfaction is not observed for these waves. Life satisfaction is also not observed in wave
11. Hence, this wave is excluded, too.
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and waves 1-7 of Understanding Society. This translates to the years 1996-2015. Previous work has
indicated that incomes at the very top and the very bottom of the income distribution suffer from large
measurement error (Berthoud and Bryan, 2011; Figari, 2012). Moreover, self-employed individuals are
known to either under- or over-report their incomes (Hurst et al., 2013). For these reasons, I exclude
the top and bottom 1% within each wave of household income, as well as all self-employed individuals
from the analysis. Since very few individuals younger than 20 years or older than 70 years are observed
to have labor earnings (which is needed to instrument household income), I also exclude all individuals
that fall outside of this range.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Median SD Min Max
Germany(1984-2015)
Life satisfaction 152457 7.175 8.000 1.636 0.000 10.000
HH income (2005 €) 152457 39559 36709 16269 5797 125339
Eq. HH income (2005 €) 152457 21340 19581 8714 2731 115780
Ln of HH income (2005 €) 152457 10.503 10.511 0.414 8.665 11.739
Ln of eq.HH income (2005 €) 152457 9.895 9.882 0.380 7.913 11.659
Ln of ref.eq.HH income (2005 €) 152457 9.848 9.815 0.191 9.217 10.403
Germany (1996-2015)
Life satisfaction 111427 7.161 7.000 1.616 0.000 10.000
HH income (2005 €) 111427 40611 37629 17019 5921 125339
Eq. HH income (2005 €) 111427 22209 20319 9159 3152 115780
Ln of HH income (2005 €) 111427 10.525 10.536 0.425 8.686 11.739
Ln of eq.HH income (2005 €) 111427 9.933 9.919 0.386 8.056 11.659
Ln of ref.eq.HH income (2005 €) 111427 9.879 9.854 0.199 9.217 10.403
UK (1996-2015)
Life satisfaction 97365 5.175 5.000 1.301 1.000 7.000
HH income (2005 €) 97365 29229 27060 14306 1349 113796
Eq. HH income (2005 €) 97365 16247 14954 7540 910 98944
Ln of HH income (2005 €) 97365 10.158 10.206 0.522 7.207 11.642
Ln of eq.HH income (2005 €) 97365 9.593 9.613 0.463 6.814 11.502
Ln of ref.eq.HH income (2005 €) 97365 9.634 9.639 0.222 8.656 10.065
In the UKHLS, Life Satisfaction is measured on a 1-7 scale, with respondents first being presented the
statement “Here are some questions about how you feel about your life. Please tick the number which you
feel best describes how dissatisfied or satisfied you are with the following aspects of your current situation.
1 = Not satisfied at all 7 = Completely satisfied”. This is followed by a set of questions relating to various
life domains. After these, respondents are presented with a separate question reading: “Using the same
scale, how dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?”. Within the GSOEP, life satisfaction is
measured on a 0-10 scale, with respondents answering the question “In conclusion we would like to ask
you about your satisfaction with your life in general, please answer according to the following scale: 0
means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied: How satisfied are you with your life, all
things considered?”. As can be discerned from figure 4, the distribution of responses to these questions
is also very similar across countries. Regarding income, in both cases I first use annual post-government
(net of taxes and benefits) household income. The relevant income variable is provided by Levy and
Jenkins (2012) for the BHPS, while it is directly provided in Understanding Society and the German
SOEP. I deflate both income variables using the consumer price index (base=2005) and use the modified
OECD scale to equivalize household incomes. This scale assigns a weight of 1 to the first member of the
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household, a weight of 0.5 to every subsequent adult, and a weight of 0.3 for every child in the household.
Definitions for all control variables can be found in Appendix table A1.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for my main variables of interest - household income and life
satisfaction. The overall standard deviation of life satisfaction is roughly 1.62 in the German sample,
whereas for the British sample it is roughly 1.30. Thus, the ratio of standard deviations (1.62/1.30 ≈ 1.25)
is reasonably similar to the ratios of the response scales (11/7 ≈ 1.57) . This gives further assurance for
my comparative purposes23.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline results for Germany
In this section, I present my results for my baseline estimations of variants of equations (1) and (2) using
GSOEP data for the period 1984-2015. In section 5.2, I give results for equations (2) and (3) using
instrumented income. Thereafter, in section 5.3, I then estimate similar models for both the UK and
Germany on a more restricted time period. In section 5.4, I give results for different sub-groups. When
I say that an effect or coefficient is significant, I mean that I obtain a p-value below 0.05. When I say
marginally significant, I mean 0.05 ≤ p < 0.1. When I say marginally insignificant, I mean 0.2 > p ≥ 0.1.
When I say insignificant, I mean p ≥ 0.2.
Table 2 gives results for variants of equations (1) and (2). The estimates of column 1 are closest to
those of Di Tella et al. (2010) in that real net household income with contemporaneous controls only are
used (i.e. equation (1) is estimated). Like Di Tella et al. (2010), I find significant adaptation to own
income that is roughly equal in magnitude to that which they find (-0.120 vs. -0.150; see their table 1
column 2). The contemporaneous effect that I obtain is similar to theirs (0.305 vs. 0.230). However,
especially given my much larger samples (I have 15 extra years available), I obtain a significant long-run
effect, implying partial rather than full adaptation to own income. Concerning reference incomes, I find
an insignificant and negative short-run effect24. However, the long-run effect is statistically significant,
negative and sizable (=-0.262).
In column 2, I again use raw household income to estimate equation (2), which now includes lags of
all controls. This extension slightly diminishes the short-run effect of own income. More importantly,
however, the long-run effect of own income is now slightly larger than the short-run effect. Thus, all
evidence of adaptation observed in column 1 vanishes in column 2. Difference of the same trend were
also seen by Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag (2008) and Vendrik (2013)25. As explained in section 3.1,
this suggests that significant adaptation observed in column 1 is the result of omitted variable bias, i.e.
adaptation to one of the control variables which are correlated with income. With respect to the effects
23We need not expect these ratios to equal: It may well be that there is less variance in life satisfaction in Germany than
in the UK.
24In all regressions I use equivalized reference incomes. When using reference incomes that are not equivalized I find a
positive short-run effect and a zero long-run effect. This is in line with the results of Pfaff (2013) in his table B.2, columns
1 and 2. A possible explanation for this is that the effects of household composition of those in the reference group follow
a similar dynamic as the effects of the respondent’s own household composition (see main text below): It may be that
reference incomes computed on the basis of raw household income pick up (possibly age-specific) variation in the household
compositions of the reference group. If so, a positive contemporaneous reference income effect might really just reflect that
many in the reference group e.g. marry, which might - if the respondent anticipates to marry soon, too - in turn provide a
positive signal to the respondent.
25Vendrik (2013) also suggests that there may be adaptation in household composition, a point I develop below.
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Table 2: Baseline results for equation (2), West Germany (1984-2015)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HH income,
contemp. controls
HH income,
lagged controls
Eq.HH income,
contemp. controls
Eq.HH income,
lagged controls
SR effect of own income 0.305*** 0.257*** 0.274*** 0.254***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
LR effect of own income 0.186*** 0.277*** 0.271*** 0.280***
(0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037)
Adaptation to own income -0.120*** 0.020 -0.003 0.026
(0.025) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
SR effect of reference income -0.136 -0.132 -0.166 -0.134
(0.132) (0.139) (0.131) (0.139)
LR effect of reference income -0.262** -0.268* -0.316** -0.273**
(0.126) (0.137) (0.126) (0.137)
Adaptation to reference income -0.126 -0.136 -0.150 -0.139
(0.127) (0.161) (0.127) (0.161)
SR effect of joint income 0.169 0.125 0.108 0.120
(0.132) (0.140) (0.132) (0.140)
LR effect of joint income -0.076 0.009 -0.044 0.007
(0.125) (0.139) (0.126) (0.138)
Adaptation to joint income -0.246* -0.116 -0.152 -0.113
(0.128) (0.163) (0.128) (0.163)
Serial Correlation 0.038 0.035 0.039 0.035
Average T 7.830 7.830 7.830 7.830
Number of Persons 19472 19472 19472 19472
Number of Observations 152457 152457 152457 152457
Estimated with the ’reghdfe’ command of Correia (2018). Individual and year fixed-effects & (lagged) controls included.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.2, * p<0.10, ** p<0.050, *** p<0.010
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of reference incomes, the addition of lagged controls has virtually no effect.
In columns 3 and 4, I perform the same estimations as in column 1 and 2, but use equivalized
household income instead. For both columns, my results are very similar to the results of column 2.
My estimates of the short-run and long-run effects of own income are roughly equal and hence give no
evidence of either adaptation or reinforcement, independent of whether the lags of controls are included
or not. My estimates for reference income are again not qualitatively changed in these regressions.
Recall that the joint income effects are simply the sums of the own and reference income effects. These
coefficients may be interpreted as the marginal effects of equally sized and permanent income changes of
both the respondent and all members of the respondent’s reference group. These estimates therefore give
an answer to the question of whether everybody gets happier when everybody gets richer. The answer
is no: I generally find positive but insignificant short-run effect, and insignificant (and more negative)
long-run effects. All adaptation to joint income is insignificant.
That significant adaptation to own income is observed when using non-equivalized household income
and no adaptation is observed when using equivalized household income (and including contemporaneous
controls in both cases), is precisely the result that puzzled Pfaff (2013). It may seem odd that the
results for non-equivalized household income are very strongly dependent on the inclusion of the lags
of controls, while those for equivalized household income are not. However, equivalizing (the lags of)
household income implicitly entails controlling for terms for the lags of the variable that determines the
equivalization scale, i.e. the numbers of adults and children in the household. This can be seen as follows:
Let yeqi,t be equivalized HH income and y
defl
i,t be non-equalized HH income. The equivalization scale is
given by EQi,t ≡ (1 + (nadultsi,t − 1)) ∗ 0.5 + nchildreni,t ∗ 0.3. Hence: yeqi,t ≡
ydefl
i,t
EQi,t
. We can then write
the model in, e.g., (2), using equivalized income, as:
LSi,t =
3∑
k=0
β0−k[ln(
ydefli,t−k
EQi,t−k
)] + ... (6)
.
We can rewrite this to give:
LSi,t =
3∑
k=0
βinc0−k ln(y
defl
i,t−k) +
3∑
k=0
βcomp0−k ln(EQi,t−k) + ... (7)
with (by assumption) βinc0−k = −βcomp0−k . Hence, each income related coefficient in the models using
equivalized income implicitly includes controls for the ln of the numbers adults and children. The fact
that results in columns 3 and 4 vary only very little therefore means that the omitted variables which
drove the divergence in results in columns 1 and 2 were to a large extent some combination of the number
of children and the number of adults. We hence seem to adapt not to changes in income, but to changes in
household composition. These results give a comprehensive explanation for why Pfaff (2013) and Binder
and Coad (2010) find adaptation to income when using non-equivalized income, but fail to do so when
using equivalized income: That which is observed as adaptation to own income in the non-equivalized
case, is really reinforcement of the negative household composition effect that is controlled for in the
equivalized case. This is further analyzed in section 5.5. There I investigate whether the effects of
additional adults or of additional children drive these results, and whether the OECD equivalence scale
over- or undercompensates in the short- and long-run.
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Given that I use the most comprehensive set of controls in columns (2) and (4), I take these to be
my preferred specifications. Notice that the results in these columns are, as one would expect, nearly
identical. I therefore conclude that I obtain no valid evidence of adaptation for own income, insignificant
reinforcement for reference income, and insignificant adaptation to joint income. The oft-cited evidence
of adaptation to own non-equivalized income observed by Di Tella et al. (2010) appears entirely driven by
reinforcement of the negative effect of household composition. I further find evidence of significant long-
run effects for own (positive) and reference (negative) income, which in conjunction yield an insignificant
long-run effect of joint income that is very close to zero. Taken together, these findings support the
relative-income explanation for the Easterlin Paradox.
5.2 Extended results for Germany
Table 3: Extended results for equation (2) and (3), West Germany (1984-2015)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Instr.Eq.
HH income,
lagged controls
Instr.Eq.
HH income,
lagged controls,
lagged LS
Instr.Eq.
HH income,
lagged controls,
indust. & occup.
Instr.Eq.
HH income,
lagged controls,
lagged LS,
indust. & occup.
Lagged life satisfaction 0.263 0.263
SR effect of own income 0.687*** 0.715*** 0.409** 0.421**
(0.181) (0.188) (0.169) (0.175)
LR effect of own income 0.523*** 0.514*** 0.465*** 0.464***
(0.117) (0.130) (0.118) (0.133)
Adaptation to own income -0.163 -0.201 0.055 0.043
(0.171) (0.180) (0.159) (0.168)
SR effect of reference income -0.203+ -0.267* -0.182+ -0.236*
(0.142) (0.140) (0.142) (0.139)
LR effect of reference income -0.321** -0.352** -0.317** -0.351**
(0.143) (0.152) (0.143) (0.152)
Adaptation to reference income -0.118 -0.085 -0.135 -0.115
(0.166) (0.174) (0.166) (0.174)
SR effect of joint income 0.484** 0.448** 0.227 0.185
(0.207) (0.211) (0.201) (0.204)
LR effect of joint income 0.202+ 0.162 0.148 0.112
(0.156) (0.168) (0.160) (0.173)
Adaptation to joint income -0.282+ -0.286+ -0.080 -0.072
(0.212) (0.221) (0.207) (0.217)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 54.945 56.511 67.360 68.450
Serial Correlation 0.029 -0.219 0.028 -0.217
Average T 7.830 7.831 7.830 7.831
Number of Persons 19472 19381 19472 19381
Number of Observations 152457 151765 152457 151765
Estimated with Correia’s ’reghdfe’ command.
Coefficient on lagged life satisfaction obtained with De Vos’ & Ruyssen’s ’xtbcfe’ command.
Individual and year fixed-effects & (lagged) controls included.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.2, * p<0.10, ** p<0.050, *** p<0.010
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As explained in section 3.2, while more robust and comprehensive than many of the results in the
previous literature, the results of section 5.1 may nevertheless suffer from a negative bias in the own
income effect via measurement error and unobserved costs to income generation. The results may further
suffer from a downward bias in the estimate of adaptation via the omission of higher order lags and biases
of unknown direction via the omission of further time varying controls. In table 3, I therefore present
estimates in which I try to correct for these potential problems using the approach given in section 3.2.
In column 1 of table 3, I take the same specification as that of table 2, column 4, but instrument for
all own income terms. This yields long- and short-run effects for own income that are roughly twice the
size of the observed own income effects. This difference is roughly in line with the results of Powdthavee
(2010), Luechinger (2009) or Knight and Gunatilaka (2010)26. Although the long-run effect is now
somewhat smaller than the short-run effect, my estimate of adaptation continues to be insignificant
(p=0.34). This result contradicts the finding of Vendrik (2013) who finds significant adaptation to own
income when instrumenting. In the Appendix (table A2) I investigate the sensitivity of my estimates to
the exclusion of each control. That exercise reveals that when I fail to include partner’s employment,
I do obtain marginally significant estimates of adaptation. It turns out that there is a large positive
contemporaneous effect of partner employment that is subject to full adaptation after three periods.
Especially for Women, partner employment is strongly correlated with household income. As Vendrik
(2013) does not include partner’s employment status (nor does any other study that I am aware of), it
seems that the estimates of Vendrik (2013) also suffer from omitted variable bias27.
Looking at reference incomes, my effect estimates for both the short-run and the long-run are now
slightly larger than in table 2 but qualitatively unaffected. When adding the effects of own income
and reference income, I now obtain a large and significant short-run effect of joint income. This short-
run effect of joint income is then subject to (marginally insignificant) adaptation, yielding a marginally
insignificant (but positive), long-run effect of joint income.
In column 2, I present my first estimate of equation (3). The inclusion of lagged life satisfaction
to the model makes little substantive difference to any of the results28, albeit yielding a slightly larger
estimate for the short-run effect of own income and the effect of reference income (which is now marginally
significant). The fact that there is very little change in results when including lagged life satisfaction
or not suggests that a lag length of K = 3 is sufficient if the effects of higher order lags indeed decay
exponentially. In table A4 of the Appendix I provide a further test for this. There, I take the specification
of table 3, column 1 but let the number of lags K vary between 1 and 5. This reveals that the effects of
own income are indeed robust to changes in the lag length, with my estimate of adaptation always being
26Knight and Gunatilaka (2010) and Powdthavee (2010) use different instruments to the one employed here. Vendrik
(2013) and Luechinger (2009) use the same kind of instrument. The fact that different instruments produce similar changes
in results when comparing OLS and IV estimates, suggests that it is not a violation of the exclusion restriction that is
driving these changes.
27In the Appendix (table A6) I also verify a result from section 5.1: When instrumenting for raw, rather than equivalized
household income it is possible to obtain significant evidence of partial adaptation to own income. When, and only when,
one fails to include lags for household composition, significant adaptation can be observed there. However, the discussion
in section 3.1 shows that doing so would be mistaken.
28Note, however, how my estimate of first order serial correlation in the residuals turns much more negative with the
inclusion of lagged life satisfaction. Under the null of a dynamically complete model in a fixed effects settings, I should
expect the serial correlation to equal −1
T¯−1 (see Wooldridge (2010), p.275). When including lagged life satisfaction in column
2 of table 2 I obtain a deviation from that of 0.07 (= −17.83−1 − (−)0.22). When failing to include life satisfaction I obtain a
deviation from this expected serial correlation of -0.18 (= −17.83−1 − 0.03). The inclusion of lagged life satisfaction therefore
makes the model more dynamically complete.
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insignificant. However, it seems as though the long-run reference income effect is not quite as stable,
yielding somewhat larger estimates with greater lag lengths. Though this was already suggested by the
slightly larger estimated reference income effect found for the dynamic model in column 2 of table 3,
these results suggest that the reference income effect may be subject to very slow reinforcement that
may take longer than three years. Hence, my estimate of the long-run reference income effect is possibly
slightly biased towards zero at baseline for Germany. This also implies that my estimated joint income
effect may be somewhat upwardly biased.
Columns 3 and 4 of table 3 address a concern raised in section 3.2, namely that the instrument may pick
up further non-pecuniary positive effects of industry and occupation choice. I test for this by including
contemporaneous and lagged values of all industry and occupation dummies to the regression. In doing,
so my instrument can now only pick up the effects of varying pecuniary returns to industry-occupation
combinations via their prediction of labor incomes, while all non-pecuniary effects will be captured by
the industry and occupation dummies. The inclusion of these dummies depresses the estimates of the
short- and long-run effects of own income. Importantly, the estimate of the short-run effect is depressed
more than the estimate of the long-run effect, thus now yielding insignificant reinforcement rather than
insignificant adaptation. Thus, even the insignificant finding of adaptation in columns 1 and 2 vanishes
and reverses sign in these more robust estimations. My results for reference incomes are unaffected by
the inclusion of these dummies.
5.3 Main results for comparison of Germany and the UK
I now turn to comparative results for Germany and the UK. I am not aware of any previous paper in the
literature on adaptation in life satisfaction that has been strongly comparative. The working paper by
Pfaff (2013) uses the BHPS and GSOEP simultaneously, but is not very comparative. This general lack
of cross-country comparison is problematic: Much of the previous happiness literature seems to implicitly
view results that are obtained with data from only one country (i.e. Germany with GSOEP) as indicative
of facts beyond this particular country (i.e. rich industrialized democracies). Pursuing a comparative
approach is an informal test of this presumed external validity. Put differently, in response to a lack of
replication and/or replicability in economics and psychology (Earp and Trafimow, 2015; Chang and Li,
2018), using UKHLS data alongside GSOEP data can be viewed as a replication of what is thought to be
known from GSOEP data. To make results comparable I use the same set of controls for both countries
and restrict the estimation period for the German sample to that available for the British sample. Table
4 presents my results.
In columns 1 and 2, I replicate the estimate of table 3 column 1 using UKHLS data and the restricted
GSOEP sample. There is no statistically significant evidence of adaptation for either country. Indeed,
I observe insignificant reinforcement for the British sample. The coefficient estimate for the UK is
somewhat smaller than for Germany. However, given the smaller number of response categories and the
smaller standard deviation for life satisfaction in the British data, the substantive long-run effect of own
household income appears somewhat larger in the UK than in Germany29. Turning to reference incomes,
I find that the long-run effect of reference income for the restricted German sample is similar to the
29Standardizing effect sizes via the number of response categories yields that the UK effect equals 144% ( 11/7×0.440.48 = 1.46)
of the German effect. Standardizing via the respective standard deviations yields that UK’s effect equals 114% of the German
effect ( 1/1.30×0.441/1.61×0.48 = 1.14).
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the full German sample, yielding a significantly negative effect. Even before standardizing, the long-run
reference income effect for the UK is again similar but somewhat larger in absolute size than the German
one (-0.39 vs. -0.34). As was the case in table 3, I observe insignificant reinforcement of the reference
income effect in both cases.
In columns 3 and 4, I add dummies for each industry and occupation to provide the same check of
the instrument as given in the previous section and discussed in section 3.2.1. For both countries, this
again results in a much diminished short-run effect, but a fairly stable long-run effect for own income.
As was the case in the previous section, I now find insignificant reinforcement for Germany rather than
insignificant adaptation to own income. My estimates for reference income are again only marginally
affected. Finally, columns 5 and 6 give results when further adding lagged life satisfaction, where the
coefficient on lagged life satisfaction is fixated in the way described in section 3.2.2. My results are
qualitatively robust to this addition.
Throughout all of these analyses, both short- and long-run effects of joint income (i.e. the combined
effects of own and reference income) are insignificant in both countries. Thus, it seems that neither in
the UK nor in Germany would making everybody richer, make everybody happier. In the Appendix I
provide further robustness checks. In table A5, I investigate whether the British estimates are sensitive
to lag length. Just as was the case for Germany, my results are largely robust to the choice of the
number of lags. In table A7, I reestimated these models with instrumented raw (rather than equivalized)
household income. I again find significant adaptation to own income whenever (and only when) I fail to
include for household composition. This also agrees with my German results. Finally, table A8 replicates
the analysis of table 2 for the UK; thus using observed rather than instrumented own income. This
yields very small estimates, which agrees with the results of Pfaff (2013). Given that the BHPS does
not directly provide net income data and had to be generated with external information by Levy and
Jenkins (2012), it is likely that these estimates using observed income suffer from severe attenuation bias
due to measurement error. This indicates that it is paramount to use valid instruments in the case of
this British data.
5.4 Results for sub-groups
I now turn to investigating whether there are differences across population groups, and whether these
differences are homogeneous across the two countries I am investigating. Tables 5 (Germany) and 6
(UK) give results for when I stratify my sample between men and women (columns 1 and 2), those on
the political left and right (columns 3 and 4), and those that are either above or below median household
income at time of the survey (columns 5 and 6)30. The first two subgroups were also used in Di Tella
et al. (2010), and thus allow for a further attempt at corroboration of these studies’ main findings.
Di Tella et al. (2010) find that only women adapt to own income, and that they fully adapt. As could
be expected, I cannot confirm this finding. Instead I find insignificant reinforcement of the own income
effect for both men and women, and a much larger positive long-run effect for women than for men31, the
latter of which is even marginally insignificant. Concerning reference income, I also find such stronger
30Apart from restricting the sample, these specifications are the same as those given in table 3 column 4 (Germany), and
table 4 column 3 (UK).
31It turns out that the stronger adaptation for women that Di Tella et al. (2010) find is driven by much stronger adaptation
to partner employment and household composition for women that for men. These additional regressions are available from
the author.
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effects for German women than for German men (the latter effect is again insignificant). Thus, German
women benefit more from greater household income, but are also harmed more from higher incomes of
others. I do not observe these differences in British sample; there I find roughly the same long-run effects
for men and women when looking at own income, and an effect of reference incomes that is even larger
for men (and marginally insignificant for women). I can only speculate to explain this cross-country
difference. It might be that there are further uncontrolled-for hedonic costs to income generation that
are picked up by my instrument. If so, and given that (in my sample) women in Germany are less
likely to earn more than their partners (18%) than women in the UK (23%), women in Germany may
on average be better able to benefit from higher shared household incomes without suffering the hedonic
costs of income generation. Another possibility is that the assumption of equal income sharing within
a household (Jenkins, 1991) is not met. If women in Germany are able to capture a relatively greater
control over household income with each additional Euro than British women and German men, I should
observe a greater long-run effect for women German women over German men and British women.
With regard to political orientation32, my results go largely counter to Di Tella et al. (2010) and are
not fully consistent across countries. Di Tella et al. (2010) find adaptation to own income for those on
the left, and larger long-run effects for those on the right. I can confirm the latter finding: In Germany,
for those on the right of the political spectrum, I find a much larger long-run effect of own income, while
for those on the left the effect is even marginally insignificant. However, unlike Di Tella et al. (2010),
I find insignificant reinforcement rather than adaptation in both groups. Moreover, in the UK, own
income effects are not much different across these groups, with the effect even being slightly larger for
those on the left. Nevertheless, differences in long-run reference income effects are consistent across both
countries. In each case, the long-run reference income effect is negative and much larger (in absolute
size) for those on the left than for those on the right (where they are insignificant in both countries).
A striking pattern emerges when distinguishing between those above and those below median income.
In both countries, short- and long-run effects of own income are insignificant and very close to zero
when considering those above the median, while they are very sizable and significant for those below the
median33. This results is in line with the claim that higher incomes do not yield any additional utility
after a certain threshold, i.e. that we satiate with respect to income. All previous evidence of this claim
that I am aware of has been either purely cross-sectional and concerned with the short-run only (Jebb
et al., 2018) or concerned with GDPpc rather than individual income (Proto and Rustichini, 2013). My
result also runs counter to the evidence of Kahneman and Deaton (2010)34 and Stevenson and Wolfers
(2013) (the latter only study GDPpc). In line with previous evidence from Peng (2017), I find a similar
pattern when considering reference incomes: the long-run effects are much larger in absolute size for
32In both the German and the British case, I define my sub-sample via variables asking respondents to declare their
party preference. In Germany, if their preference is one of Social Democrats (SPD), Greens (Grüne), Lefts (Die Linke), or
Pirates (Piraten), or any combination thereof, they are are treated as being on the left. If their preference is one of Christian
Democrats (CDU, CSU), Liberals (FDP), Nationalists (NPD), or Alternative for Germany (AFD), they are treated as being
on the right. In the UK, if their preference is one of Labour, Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, Greens, or Sinn Fein,
they are treated as on the left. If their preference is one of Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Ulster Unionist, Alliance
Party, UK Independence Party, or British National Party they are treated as being on the right.
33Here I also find no adaptation for either group. No adaptation for those below the median agrees with the aforementioned
studies of Clark et al. (2016) and Crettaz and Suter (2013) that study those below the poverty line. However, given that
I do not find adaptation for any group, this is not surprising. Instead it is likely that these studies do not find adaptation
simply because they use equivalized household incomes, not because there is anything special in this respect about those
below the poverty line.
34Though they find no satiation with respect to evaluative measures of subjective well being, they do find satiation with
respect to affective measures of subjective well being.
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those below the median than for those above the median. This again holds for both countries.
As a proxy for wealth, and following Di Tella and MacCulloch (2010), I also ran estimations in which
I distinguish between homeowners, and individuals who rent. These can be found in the Appendix. In
the German case, as both the long-run effects of own and reference income were much larger for those
who rent than for homeowners, these estimations corroborated my findings concerning those above and
those below the median of the income distribution. Interestingly, my estimate of adaptation is sizable
(=-0.49) and marginally insignificant (p=0.15) for homeowners. Throughout all of my analyses, this
was the only time that I found potential credible evidence of adaptation. However, in the British case
these estimations gave largely implausible results, showing insignificant and negative short- and long-run
effects of own income for those who rent.
5.5 Investigating adaptation/reinforcement to household composition
In sections 5.1 and 5.3, it became clear that results that found evidence of adaptation to own income,
e.g those in Pfaff (2013), Di Tella et al. (2010), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2010), or Binder and Coad
(2010) were probably driven by adaptation/reinforcement to (aspects of) household composition. I will
now take up this issue in a little more depth.
Recall that in section 5.1, I say that the model of equation (2)35 can be rewritten as:
LSi,t =
K∑
k=0
βinc0−k ln(y
defl
i,t−k) +
K∑
k=0
βcomp0−k ln(EQi,t−k) (8)
+
K∑
k=0
γ0−k ln(yrefi,t−k) +
K∑
k=0
φ0−kXi,t−k + µi + τt + i,t
With EQi,t ≡ (1 + (nadultsi,t − 1)) ∗ γ1 + nchildreni,t ∗ γ2, where γ1 = 0.5 and γ2 = 0.3 are set by
the OECD as weights attached to the number of additional adults and children. This formulation shows
most clearly that when using (lagged) equivalized income, one implicitly includes a (lagged) control for
household size.
Notice that in this set-up it is assumed that for all k, βcomp0−k = −βinc0−k. If one thinks that household
income should be equivalized with respect to life satisfaction, this is a substantive assumption. In so far
as many in the literature view life satisfaction as a proxy for utility (e.g. Layard et al. (2008), Stutzer
(2004), Bayer and Juessen (2015)), and view equivalence scales as a means by which to assess - loosely
speaking - how much more money one would need in an n-person household to attain the same utility as
living alone (Rojas, 2007; Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag, 2008; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1986), this
appears plausible.
Only when it is in fact true that, βcomp0 = −βinc0 , is the contemporaneous life satisfaction effect of
own equivalized income comparable across household compositions. Similarly, only when it is true that∑∞
k=0 β
inc
0 =
∑∞
k=0−βcomp0 , is the long-run life satisfaction effect of own equivalized income comparable
across household compositions. When it is for example the case that βinc0 −βcomp0 > 0, then the negative
effect of an increase in household size is smaller than is assumed by the equivalization scale. In that case,
35The same would hold for equation (5)
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Table 7: Results for variants of equation (2): Undercompensation or overcompensation?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
W.Germany
(1984-2015):
Instr.HH income,
lagged controls,
indust. & occup.
UK (1996-2015):
Instr.HH income,
lagged controls,
indust. & occup.
W.Germany
(1984-2015):
Instr.HH income,
lagged controls,
indust. & occup.,
lagged ln(#adults)
& ln(#children)
UK (1996-2015):
Instr.HH income,
lagged controls,
indust. & occup.,
lagged ln(#adults)
& ln(#children)
SR effect of own income 0.289* 0.133 0.332** 0.166+
(0.163) (0.114) (0.164) (0.119)
LR effect of own income 0.381*** 0.331*** 0.426*** 0.382***
(0.105) (0.104) (0.117) (0.126)
Adaptation to own income 0.093 0.198* 0.094 0.217*
(0.154) (0.116) (0.155) (0.122)
SR effect of HH size -0.120 -0.177+
(0.164) (0.126)
LR effect of HH size -0.468*** -0.567***
(0.100) (0.104)
Adaptation to HH size -0.348** -0.390***
(0.152) (0.122)
SR Under-/over-compensation 0.169*** -0.045
(0.039) (0.040)
SR Under-/over-compensation -0.086** -0.236***
(0.043) (0.050)
SR effect of number of adults -0.127 -0.149*
(0.107) (0.085)
LR effect of number of adults -0.350*** -0.406***
(0.079) (0.089)
Adaptation to number of adults -0.223** -0.257***
(0.101) (0.086)
SR effect of number of children 0.045 0.010
(0.042) (0.038)
LR effect of number of children -0.057** -0.105***
(0.027) (0.028)
Adaptation to number of children -0.102** -0.116***
(0.041) (0.037)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 66.163 65.183 68.033 63.165
Serial Correlation 0.030 -0.185 0.030 -0.186
Average T 7.830 4.763 7.830 4.763
Number of Persons 19472 20443 19472 20443
Number of Observations 152457 97365 152457 97365
Estimated with Correia’s ’reghdfe’ command. Individual and year fixed-effects & (lagged) controls included.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.2, * p<0.10, ** p<0.050, *** p<0.010
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and if one would wish to equivalize on life satisfaction effects, one ought to decrease the weight on either
the number of adults (γ1) or the number of children (γ2).
I pursue the question of under- vs over-compensation in columns 1 and 2 of table 7. There, I estimate
equation (8), and thus let the weights on ln(ydefl) and ln(EQ) be estimated freely (and remove my
control for child birth). For both countries, the negative effect of household composition is much larger
in the long-run than in the short-run, implying significant reinforcement. Furthermore, in Germany the
OECD equivalence scales overcompensates (i.e. βinc0 −βcomp0 > 0) in the short-run, but undercompensates
(i.e.
∑3
k=0 β
inc
0−k −
∑3
k=0 β
comp
0−k < 0) in the long-run. In the UK, the OECD scale neither under- nor
overcompensates in the short-run, but severely undercompensates in the long-run. Such a result is
noteworthy for the following reason: Several prior studies have derived equivalence scales using subjective
satisfaction data. Examples of this are Schwarze (2003), Borah et al. (2016), Biewen and Juhasz (2017) or
Van Praag and Ferrer-i Carbonell (2008) in the German case, Bollinger et al. (2012) and Van Praag and
Ferrer-i Carbonell (2008) in the British case, or Rojas (2007) in the Mexican case. In all of these studies,
they find that the OECD equivalence scale tends to overcompensate. However, each of these studies only
estimated short-run equivalence scales, failing to take into account reinforcement in the negative effect
of household composition. My results imply that an equivalence scale that takes into account adaptation
and reinforcement to own income and household composition, would yield much smaller economies of
scale in the long-run. Importantly these would be even smaller than implied by the OECD.
It is a further question whether it is the number of adults or the number of children that drives these
results. It would have been nice to estimate βcomp0−k , γ1 and γ2 freely (as do Biewen and Juhasz (2017)),
but this would not be estimable linearly and thus be not easily accomplished in my panel-IV context. I
therefore estimated the following, simpler equation in columns 3 and 4:
LSi,t =
3∑
k=0
βinc0−k ln(y
defl
i,t−k) +
3∑
k=0
βadu0−k ln(nadultsi,t−k) +
3∑
k=0
βkid0−k ln(1 + nkidsi,t−k) (9)
+
3∑
k=0
γ0−k ln(yrefi,t−k) +
3∑
k=0
φ0−kXi,t−k + µi + τt + i,t
Independent of the country considered, the negative effect of additional adults in the household always
far exceeds that of additional children, even beyond the difference implied by the OECD scale. I even find
positive (but insignificant) short-run effects of additional children, which turn negative and significant
in the long-run. These results for children are in line with previous results that show full adaptation to
child-birth (see Angeles (2010); Clark et al. (2008); Clark and Georgellis (2013)). Finally, the specification
of equation (9) allows me to derive short- and long-run equivalence scales (cf. Rojas, 2007). Taking a
single adult living alone as the reference case, I can find the amount of additional income necessary to
obtain the same life satisfaction as when living with additional nadu adults and nkid children. This is
given by:
RSR(Y0 → Ynadu,nkid) = exp
[
ln
(
1
nadu
)
∗ β
adu
0
βinc0
+ ln
(
1
1 + nkid
)
∗ β
adu
0
βinc0
]
(10)
To see this, solve for ydefl in equation (9). Then take the ratio of this expression when nadults = nadu
to when nadults = 1, and when nkids = nkids to when nkids = 0 and simplify. For the long-run replace
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Figure 5: Illustration of equivalence scales computed from equations (10) and (11) on the basis of
parameter estimates from table 7, columns 3 (Germany) and 4 (UK). In both panels a single adult living
alone is taken to be the reference case. The panel on the left shows the amount of household income (in
% of the reference case) necessary to compensate (i.e. to obtain the same level of life satisfaction as in the
reference case) for each additional adult in the household. The right panel show the amount of household
income necessary to maintain constant life satisfaction with each additional child in the household.
the short-run coefficients βinc0 , βadu0 , and βkid0 by their long-run equivalents
∑3
k=0 β
inc
0−k,
∑3
k=0 β
adu
0−k, and∑3
k=0 β
kid
0−k to obtain:
RLR(Y0 → Ynadu,nkid) = exp
[
ln
(
1
nadu
)
∗
∑3
k=0 β
adu
0−k∑3
k=0 β
inc
0−k
+ ln
(
1
1 + nkid
)
∗
∑3
k=0 β
kid
0−k∑3
k=0 β
inc
0−k
]
(11)
I plot results for that exercise in figure 5. Full tables are given in the Appendix. From figure 5 it
becomes evident that the OECD equivalence scales completely overcompensates for additional children,
both in the short- and in the long-run. However, the OECD scale only overcompensates for additional
adults in the short-run for Germany. In the long-run, the OECD scale severely undercompensates for
the effect of additional adults. Indeed, in the British case there appear to be no economies of scale in
the long-run at all36. In so far as the German welfare state is much more comprehensive with respect to
child-care than the British (thus lessening the burden of additional children), and more willing to support
partnered households, these observed country differences may be driven by the institutional structure of
these countries.
6 Conclusion
Substantively I make three main points. First, I find no evidence of adaptation to own income. All cases
in which my estimate of adaptation is significant and negative occur when omitting variables relating
to household composition. This finding is in direct disagreement with most of the previous literature.
36Note that I control for marital status. Therefore much of the positive effect of being in a multi-adult household will be
captured by this variable.
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Second, I do not find significant adaptation or reinforcement for reference income. Third, both own
income and reference income are very sizable and of roughly equal absolute magnitude in almost every
specification. This implies that in every specification the long-run effect of joint income is insignificant.
Thus, if everybody gets richer, nobody becomes happier. Although this is a sad result, it validates the
much discussed Easterlin Paradox.
Methodologically three points are worth noting: First, instrumenting for own income is paramount. I
find much larger income effects when instrumenting, especially with respect to the UK. The pronounced
rise in effect sizes when instrumenting is in line with the IV results of Vendrik (2013), Powdthavee (2010),
Luechinger (2009) and Knight and Gunatilaka (2010). Second, the computationally and conceptually
difficult addition of lagged life satisfaction, i.e. the use of a dynamic rather than a static model is
unnecessary. All my results were qualitatively unchanged with this further complication. Third, and
though used throughout the paper as the most robust option, the addition of lags of controls is only
crucial with respect to the number of adults in the household and when using raw household income. This
is because the negative effect of the number of adults in the household is subject to strong reinforcement,
while it is also very strongly correlated with household income. In the present context, and when using
equivalized household income, one may omit the addition of lags of controls and obtain very similar
results. However this need not necessarily be so in other contexts, which means that many of the
aforementioned studies on adaptation to other life domains may also suffer from this kind of omitted
variable bias.
Beyond these points, my estimations for sub-samples show that there are differences in results across
the UK and Germany. Thus, the dynamic effects of own and reference income are not invariant to
context or should be viewed as universal psychological constants: they seem socially embedded. It would
be useful to unpack these heterogeneities further than was possible here. Furthermore, an important
limitation of this study is the use of yearly data. If adaptation to income occurs much faster than within
the first year, such adaptation could not be detected (Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag, 2008). To tackle
this problem with temporally more fine-grained data (perhaps the Australian data Frijters et al. (2008)
use) seems like a useful avenue for future research. However, given that I do find sizable short-run effects
of income, it seems that adaptation would have to follow from a very large, and possibly implausibly
large, initial effect of income. Moreover, my significant long-run effects imply that any adaptation must
be partial at best. Nevertheless, and to quote Ferrer-i Carbonell and Van Praag (2008), the discussion
is not finished yet.
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Appendix
Table A1: Description of Controls (continued on next page)
Concept GSOEP UKHLS
Number of children Dummies for: Dummies for:
0 (54.7%) 0 (59.6%)
1 (20.7%) 1 (16.9%)
2 (17.9%) 2 (17.6%)
3 (5.20%) 3 (4.87%)
4 (1.09%) 4 (0.90%)
5 (0.27%) 5 (0.12%)
6 or more (0.12%) 6 or more (0.03%)
Number of adults Dummies for: Dummies for:
1 (9.92%) 1 (12.8%)
2 (59.9%) 2 (62.0%)
3 (18.9%) 3 (16.4%)
4 (8.90%) 4 (7.14%)
5 (1.87%) 5 (1.27%)
6 or more (0.53%) 6 or more (0.34%)
Employment status Dummies for: Dummies for:
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Table A1: (continued)
Concept GSOEP UKHLS
Non-working (10.5%) Lt.sick or disabled (3.35%)
Retired (1.14%) Retired (9.70%)
Unemployed (2.25%) Unemployed (1.97%)
Student (1.00%) Student (0.62%)
Maternity leave (1.61%) Family Care (6.65%)
Working (81.6%) Working (77.5%)
Partner employment Dummies for: Dummies for:
status Working (60.9%) Working (58.9%)
No partner / NA (22.1%) No partner / NA (24.0%)
Unemployed (1.99%) Unemployed (1.39%)
Non-working (15.1%) Non-working (15.4%)
Age Mean=43.39 SD=11.03 Mean=45.35 SD=12.03
Min=23 Max=70 Min=22 Max=70
Age squared Mean=2004 SD=973.7 Mean=2202 SD=1119
Min=529 Max=4900 Min=484 Max=4900
Marital status Dummies for: Dummies for:
Married/Couple (73.5%) Married (66.4%)
Single (16.7%) Single (11.5%)
Widowed (1.49%) Widowed (2.07%)
Divorced (6.21%) Divorced (8.13%)
Separated (1.79%) Living as couple (11.9%)
Other (0.32%)
Housing Dummies for: Dummies for:
Own (51.2%) Own (79.8%)
Rented (48.8%) Rented privately (7.86%)
Social housing (12.3%)
Working hours ln(yearly working hours) ln(weekly working hours)
Mean=6.31 SD=2.72 Mean=2.71 SD=1.49
Min=0 Max=8.80 Min=0 Max=4.61
Ill health Dummy over 0-10
subj. health variable
Dummy over 1-7
subj. health variable
=1 if subj.health < 5 (13.3%) =1 if subj.health < 4 (22.4%)
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Table A1: (continued)
Concept GSOEP UKHLS
=0 if subj.health > 4 (86.6%) =1 if subj.health > 3 (77.6%)
Birth of children Dummies for Dummies for
Birth (4.03%) Birth (3.47%)
No birth (96.0%) No birth (96.5%)
Education Dummies for: Dummies for:
Inadequate/elementary (15.2%) No Qualification (11.2%)
Mittlere Reife (33.5%) GCSE (23.0%)
Abitur & Ausbildung (33.3%) A-levels (20.9%)
Tertiary education (16.6%) Tertiary degree (23.3%)
Other/missing (1.44%) Other higher (12.1%)
Region Bundeslander dummies (11) Govt. region dummies (11)
Wave Waves dummies (28) Waves dummies (16)
Regional time trend Interactions of region and waves Interactions of region and waves
Table A2: Sensitivity to removal of controls, Germany (1984-2015)
Own income Reference income
Variable omitted Short-run Long-run Adaptation Short-run Long-run Adaptation
Number of children 0.327* 0.476*** 0.149 -0.222+ -0.391*** -0.169
Number of adults 0.375** 0.412*** 0.036 -0.178 -0.319** -0.141
Employment status 0.533*** 0.528*** -0.004 -0.218+ -0.390*** -0.171
Partner employment status 0.787*** 0.525*** -0.262* -0.224+ -0.313** -0.089
Age 0.409** 0.465*** 0.055 -0.182+ -0.317** -0.135
Age-squared 0.375** 0.433*** 0.058 -0.271* -0.272* -0.001
Marital status 0.394** 0.470*** 0.075 -0.180 -0.316** -0.137
Housing tenure 0.431*** 0.488*** 0.057 -0.186+ -0.316** -0.130
Working hours 0.409** 0.464*** 0.056 -0.182+ -0.317** -0.135
Ill health 0.447*** 0.424*** -0.022 -0.194+ -0.377** -0.182
Child birth 0.357** 0.460*** 0.102 -0.171 -0.317** -0.146
Education 0.404** 0.459*** 0.054 -0.080 -0.259** -0.179+
Wave 0.387** 0.430*** 0.043 -0.362*** -0.624*** -0.261**
Region 0.407** 0.465*** 0.058 -0.178 -0.309** -0.132
Regional time trend 0.409** 0.464*** 0.054 -0.165 -0.281** -0.116
Based on specification of table 3, column 3. Each row shows estimates after removing the corresponding control
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Table A3: Sensitivity to removal of controls, UK (1996-2015)
Own income Reference income
Variable omitted Short-run Long-run Adaptation Short-run Long-run Adaptation
Number of children 0.179+ 0.436*** 0.257** -0.243* -0.402** -0.159
Number of adults 0.176+ 0.393*** 0.218* -0.212+ -0.373** -0.161
Employment status 0.174+ 0.383*** 0.209+ -0.258* -0.472*** -0.214
Partner employment status 0.237* 0.375*** 0.138 -0.243* -0.388** -0.145
Age 0.173+ 0.384*** 0.211* -0.208+ -0.370** -0.162
Age-squared 0.152 0.342*** 0.190+ -0.234* -0.453*** -0.219+
Marital status 0.119 0.356*** 0.237* -0.178 -0.387** -0.209
Housing tenure 0.174+ 0.377*** 0.203+ -0.215+ -0.388** -0.173
Working hours 0.171+ 0.377*** 0.206+ -0.220+ -0.391** -0.171
Ill health 0.165 0.343** 0.178+ -0.267* -0.452** -0.186
Child birth 0.165+ 0.380*** 0.215* -0.206+ -0.383** -0.177
Education 0.168+ 0.374*** 0.207+ -0.113 -0.152 -0.039
Wave 0.178+ 0.320** 0.142 -0.034 -0.915*** -0.882***
Region 0.171+ 0.373*** 0.202+ -0.212+ -0.377** -0.165
Regional time trend 0.170+ 0.377*** 0.207+ -0.220+ -0.378** -0.158
Based on specification of table 4, column 3. Each row shows estimates after removing the corresponding control
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Table A8: Results for equation (2) using observed income, UK (1996-2015)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HH income,
contemp. controls
HH income,
lagged controls
Eq.HH income,
contemp. controls
Eq.HH income,
lagged controls
SR effect of own income 0.083*** 0.069*** 0.075*** 0.068***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
LR effect of own income 0.032+ 0.108*** 0.098*** 0.111***
(0.025) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)
Adaptation to own income -0.051** 0.038+ 0.023 0.042*
(0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026)
SR effect of reference income -0.201+ -0.181+ -0.207+ -0.181+
(0.129) (0.133) (0.129) (0.133)
LR effect of reference income -0.240* -0.312* -0.279* -0.313*
(0.145) (0.161) (0.145) (0.161)
Adaptation to reference income -0.039 -0.130 -0.072 -0.132
(0.121) (0.159) (0.122) (0.159)
SR effect of joint income -0.118 -0.112 -0.132 -0.113
(0.129) (0.133) (0.129) (0.133)
LR effect of joint income -0.207+ -0.204 -0.180 -0.202
(0.144) (0.161) (0.144) (0.161)
Adaptation to joint income -0.090 -0.092 -0.049 -0.089
(0.122) (0.160) (0.122) (0.160)
Serial Correlation -0.174 -0.177 -0.174 -0.177
Average T 4.763 4.763 4.763 4.763
Number of Persons 20443 20443 20443 20443
Number of Observations 97365 97365 97365 97365
Estimated with Correia’s ’reghdfe’ command. Individual and year fixed-effects & (lagged) controls included.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.2, * p<0.10, ** p<0.050, *** p<0.010
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Table A9: Results for home owners versus non-owners in W.Germany and UK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
W.Germany
(1996-2015):
Instr.eq.
HH income,
lagged controls,
indust. & occup.,
renting
W.Germany
(1996-2015):
Instr.eq.
HH income,
lagged controls,
indust. & occup.,
home owners
UK (1996-2015):
Instr.eq.
HH income,
lagged controls,
indust. & occup.,
renting
UK (1996-2015):
Instr.eq.
HH income,
lagged controls,
indust. & occup.,
home owners
SR effect of own income 0.326+ 0.619* -0.276 0.245+
(0.224) (0.356) (0.334) (0.150)
LR effect of own income 0.578*** 0.134 -0.156 0.435***
(0.184) (0.186) (0.469) (0.147)
Adaptation to own income 0.252 -0.486+ 0.120 0.190
(0.198) (0.339) (0.365) (0.148)
SR effect of reference income -0.182 -0.167 -0.276 -0.280*
(0.214) (0.201) (0.422) (0.157)
LR effect of reference income -0.567** -0.221 -0.738+ -0.258+
(0.225) (0.202) (0.541) (0.186)
Adaptation to reference income -0.385+ -0.053 -0.461 0.021
(0.261) (0.230) (0.491) (0.190)
SR effect of joint income 0.144 0.452+ -0.552 -0.034
(0.294) (0.343) (0.437) (0.172)
LR effect of joint income 0.011 -0.087 -0.893* 0.177
(0.254) (0.233) (0.542) (0.216)
Adaptation to joint income -0.133 -0.539+ -0.341 0.211
(0.303) (0.351) (0.516) (0.203)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 40.652 21.564 20.597 43.314
Serial Correlation -0.008 -0.007 -0.283 -0.187
Average T 6.733 7.156 3.981 4.775
Number of Persons 10924 10829 4776 16195
Number of Observations 73552 77494 19012 77339
Estimated with Correia’s ’reghdfe’ command. Individual and year fixed-effects & (lagged) controls included.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.2, * p<0.10, ** p<0.050, *** p<0.010
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Table A10: Short- and long-run equivalence scales for Germany
Number of children
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of
Adults
1 1.000/1.000
0.910/
1.097
0.862/
1.158
0.829/
1.203
0.804/
1.239
0.784/
1.270
0.768/
1.296
2 1.303/1.769
1.186/
1.940
1.123/
2.048
1.080/
2.128
1.048/
2.192
1.022/
2.246
1.001/
2.293
3 1.522/2.470
1.385/
2.709
1.311/
2.859
1.261/
2.971
1.223/
3.061
1.193/
3.136
1.169/
3.201
4 1.698/3.130
1.546/
3.433
1.463/
3.623
1.407/
3.765
1.365/
3.878
1.332/
3.974
1.304/
4.056
5 1.850/3.761
1.684/
4.124
1.594/
4.353
1.533/
4.524
1.487/
4.660
1.451/
4.775
1.421/
4.874
6 1.983/4.369
1.805/
4.792
1.709/
5.058
1.643/
5.256
1.594/
5.415
1.555/
5.548
1.523/
5.663
Calculated with parameter estimates from the specification of table 7, column 3.
First element of each cell refers to the short-run, second element refers to the long-run
Table A11: Short- and long-run equivalence scales for the UK
Number of children
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of
Adults
1 1.000/1.000
0.958/
1.211
0.934/
1.354
0.917/
1.466
0.905/
1.559
0.894/
1.639
0.886/
1.710
2 1.863/2.086
1.784/
2.526
1.740/
2.825
1.709/
3.058
1.685/
3.252
1.666/
3.420
1.650/
3.568
3 2.681/3.208
2.568/
3.884
2.504/
4.343
2.459/
4.702
2.425/
5.000
2.398/
5.258
2.375/
5.487
4 3.471/4.353
3.324/
5.270
3.241/
5.893
3.184/
6.380
3.140/
6.785
3.104/
7.135
3.075/
7.445
5 4.241/5.516
4.061/
6.678
3.960/
7.468
3.890/
8.084
3.836/
8.598
3.793/
9.041
3.757/
9.434
6 4.995/6.693
4.784/
8.103
4.664/
9.062
4.582/
9.810
4.518/
10.433
4.467/
10.971
4.425/
11.447
Calculated with parameter estimates from the specification of table 7, column 4.
First element of each cell refers to the short-run, second element refers to the long-run
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